In the autumn of 2023, everyone—from President Zelensky and military intelligence to dozens of experts—warned Ukrainians that the winter of 2023/2024 could be even more challenging than the previous one. We were expecting thousands of “Shahids” and hundreds of rockets aimed at our power plants, distribution nodes, and transformers. But now, at the beginning of March, it seems that we have avoided catastrophic consequences from Russian winter attacks, and the Ukrainian energy sector has generally weathered this winter well. Why is that?
On one hand, the Russians concentrated their strikes this winter primarily on industrial regions and vital logistic hubs—actively targeting the Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava regions, Odessa and the ports of the Odessa region. After Ukrainian naval drones drove the Russian Black Sea fleet into distant ports and largely expelled them from Crimea, Ukraine was able to restore maritime trade. Therefore, attacking port infrastructure and industry from the air became the main priority for the Russians. This tactic is significantly different from the previous one, where the enemy primarily sought to freeze Ukrainians and plunge the entire country into darkness.
At the same time, Russians continued to attack the energy infrastructure of frontline territories this winter, but throughout the season, they failed to “blackout” the country or a significant portion of it even once. Cyberattacks on the energy infrastructure also had no success, although Russian attempts persisted every day and every hour.
Ukraine turned out to be much better prepared for shelling than a year ago. The shelling from the previous winter led to deferred consequences—I think you remember the accidents and breakdowns in the summer of 2023. And massive successful attacks on energy, if they had succeeded for the Russians, could have led to truly catastrophic consequences. But overall, Ukraine turned out to be much better prepared for this winter, managed to protect its energy and industrial infrastructure and restored maritime export volumes practically to pre-war levels.
Now we can summarize the factors that helped Ukraine pass through the winter so smoothly.
- 1. Restoration of generation after damages from the previous year. Minister Halushchenko estimated that over 2 GW of generation capacity had been restored to the energy system through repairs—equivalent to at least 4 large thermal power plants.
- 2. Weather. For the second consecutive winter, Ukraine did not experience severe frosts—temperatures below critical minus 10 degrees Celsius lasted no longer than 3-4 days even in specific regions. Therefore, the pressure on heat and electricity generation was low.
- 3. Expanded energy exchange with the EU. In November, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) increased the capacity for supplying electricity to Ukraine by 500 MW, bringing it to 1,700 MW.
- 4. Strengthening of air defense systems. Ukraine possesses a significant amount of foreign weaponry used in parallel with Soviet-era models. In addition to 4. Western assistance, mobile air defense groups, camouflage, and reinforcement of critical infrastructure objects help combat Russian drones and missiles.
- 5. Fear of Ukrainian retaliation. Ukrainian drones reached Moscow and St. Petersburg, destroying critical infrastructure of the Russian military industry and blocking opportunities for Russian occupiers. Therefore, fearing retaliation, the Russians approach attacks on critical infrastructure cautiously.
- 6. Efforts of energy companies in decentralizing energy supply. Throughout 2023, energy companies did a lot of “homework,” preparing reserve capacities for energy delivery and stocking up on transformers and repair equipment.
- 7. Strategic reserves. Ukraine has accumulated sufficient reserves of gas, oil, coal, and nuclear fuel to successfully pass through the heating season.
Overall, Russian hopes were not realized this winter. When in January 2024, industry increased consumption by 27%, and private consumers by almost 14%, Ukraine still had enough surplus electricity production to resume exports. Ukraine sold electricity to Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, and Romania. Since the beginning of January 2024, commercial net imports to Ukraine have almost halved, and by mid-February, net exports became positive.
However, the overall positive outcome in energy for the winter of 2023/2024 does not relieve the Ukrainian government, businesses, and our international partners of the need to prepare for the next one. For example, there is a need to create additional generation capacities, as Ukraine may lose up to 0.5 GW of generating capacity due to constant attacks by Russians on the Kurakhivska and Slovianska thermal power plants.
Furthermore, Ukraine needs to continue the policy of decentralizing energy supply, further integrating into the European energy network, and implementing a more consistent energy-saving policy. To encourage our cities and enterprises to invest more in modern energy, grants and loans from the World Bank and European energy funds can be utilized.
Ultimately, our energy security can be significantly strengthened by investing in domestic extraction and green energy in conflict-free territories. To increase gas production, build wind and solar power plants, we need investments from both Western and Eastern investors. And once again, we return to guarantees for businesses, judicial reform, and institutional changes. Because these are also investments in security, including energy security.
Alexander Katsuba is a Ukrainian entrepreneur, an expert in the field of energy, and the owner of the company ALPHA GAZ.